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Empowerment without 
Accountability? The Lawyers’ 
Movement in Pakistan and its 
Aftershocks*
Maryam S. Khan1
Abstract This case study on the Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement and its 
aftermath aims to add to our knowledge of judicial empowerment 
processes, particularly the role of lawyers in mobilising for an independent 
judiciary, and the conditions for political lawyering as an effective pathway 
to judicial empowerment. In exploring these processes and conditions of 
empowerment, the study also examines their relationship with the longer-
term outcomes of empowerment as well as the nexus between judicial 
empowerment and accountability of legal institutions. The study marshals 
evidence from multiple sources – including 35 qualitative interviews 
with movement leaders and participants, and a representative survey of 
active litigators in the Lahore District judiciary – to show, firstly, that the 
conditions that create successful mobilisation for judicial empowerment can 
significantly limit the systemic benefits of such mobilisation and, secondly, 
that the conditions for and the pathway to empowerment may deeply 
constrain the accountability of the empowered actors and institutions.  
Keywords: Lawyers’ Movement, political lawyering, legal mobilisation, 
judicial empowerment, accountability, Pakistan bar, legal complex, legal 
professions, sociology of  lawyers, social movements.
1 Introduction
The ‘Lawyers’ Movement’ in Pakistan – that began in early 2007 and 
culminated two years later in the restoration of  judges removed by 
a military regime – prompted worldwide interest in the potential for 
political lawyering. The movement offers an unparalleled example of  
professional mobilisation in support of  the judiciary. Triggered by the 
unconstitutional removal of  the Supreme Court Chief  Justice Iftikhar 
Chaudhry by then military dictator General Pervez Musharraf, the 
movement sustained for two years through rapidly evolving political 
circumstances. It had two palpable outcomes: the downfall of  the 
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Musharraf  regime and a transition to electoral democracy; and the 
reinstatement of  the Chief  Justice and other illegally deposed judges 
from the Supreme Court and the provincial High Courts. Rule of  
law and independence of  the judiciary were hailed as legacies of  the 
movement (Kausar 2012).
This case study aims to address the deficit in our knowledge of  judicial 
empowerment processes, particularly the role of  lawyers in mobilising 
for an independent judiciary, and the conditions for political lawyering 
as an effective pathway to judicial empowerment. As a singular example 
of  political action by lawyers, the movement eludes existing typologies 
of  legal mobilisation, such as ‘cause lawyering’ (Sarat and Sheingold 
1998), ‘political lawyering’ (Minow 1996), or ‘lawyering for social 
movements’ (McCann 2006; Sarat and Sheingold 2006). Lawyers were 
the principal movement activists and deployed diverse forms of  political 
action – both within and without the courtroom, involving subversive 
strategies such as street mobilisation and court boycotts – to restore 
the judiciary. Much as Pakistan’s example demonstrates that ‘political 
lawyering’ can be a major determinant of  judicial empowerment, it 
also presents sobering findings about the long-term effects of  political 
lawyering as a pathway to achieving an independent judiciary.
The study offers two such findings, both of  which are grounded in 
the interaction of  the larger political context on the one hand with 
the processes and conditions of  mobilisation on behalf  of  judicial 
empowerment on the other, the latter including mechanisms and 
strategies of  political lawyering. One fundamental finding is that the 
movement heavily circumscribed the scope, as well as the impact, of  
judicial empowerment. It projected judicial power within a very narrow 
sphere of  judicial–executive competition and mega-politics, and limited 
the benefits of  judicial autonomy to an elite and unaccountable group 
of  judges and lawyers.
Another major finding is that just as the movement strengthened 
judicial autonomy, it created political opportunities for the judiciary 
to simultaneously enlarge its political power and insulate itself  from 
external checks (Kalhan 2013; Khan 2014; Siddique 2015). In other 
words, the context and conditions of  lawyers’ mobilisation set in 
motion parallel processes of  judicial empowerment, and judicial 
self-preservation. Far from creating an impetus for redistributing power 
and resources within the judicial system or making the system more 
responsive to litigants, the movement produced downstream constraints 
for the political and institutional accountability of  both lawyers and 
judges, the very actors who mobilised against an unaccountable 
military regime.
Abstracting from Pakistan’s experience, the study points to two general 
observations on empowerment and accountability of  broader relevance 
to political development in transitional contexts. Firstly, the context, 
conditions, and pathways that create successful mobilisation on behalf  
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of  judicial empowerment have a significant bearing on the outcomes, 
and may indeed have the effect of  inhibiting structural changes in the 
judicial system despite some immediate gains in autonomy. Secondly, 
the move towards judicial empowerment may or may not coexist 
with or stimulate a broad-based mobilisation for more responsive and 
accountable legal institutions. Paradoxically, the context, conditions, 
and pathways that produce judicial empowerment may create an 
impulse in the higher judiciary to insist on self-governance, sealing 
itself  off from external accountability. Anchored in these two findings 
– the incongruence between empowerment and its outcomes, and the 
tensions between empowerment and accountability – this Pakistan 
case study tells a cautionary tale about the complex, contingent, and 
non-linear trajectory from judicial empowerment to an accountable and 
responsive judicial system.
The study is structured as follows. The first section provides a brief  
historical context to the Lawyers’ Movement, and underlines the 
lawyers’ political action as the key movement mobiliser. This analysis 
is based on a combination of  qualitative sources, including news 
reports and legal archive material, as well as 35 stakeholder interviews 
with a cross-section of  lawyers representing both movement leaders 
and participants. It seeks to explain the conditions in which the ‘legal 
complex’ – i.e. legal institutions in the aggregate, particularly the core 
inter-institutional network between lawyers and judges (Halliday, Karpik 
and Feeley 2007, 2012) – mobilised and sustained the movement. The 
second section shifts focus from the movement to post-movement bar 
politics and examines the nexus between the two, especially in relation 
to accountability. In addition to other sources, it presents original data 
from a mixed representative survey of  654 active litigators in the Lahore 
District courts concerning their perceptions and actions vis-à-vis the bar 
and the judiciary. The article concludes with the main findings of  the 
study and their implications for empowerment and accountability.
2 Revisiting the Lawyers’ Movement – what the evidence shows
2.1 Historical and political context
The Pakistani bar inherited its structure from colonial times 
(Schmitthener 1968). Apart from the Pakistan Bar Council (PBC) and 
its five provincial off-shoots – the regulatory bodies for lawyers – lawyers 
are voluntarily organised into bar associations at every tier of  legal 
practice: from tehsil bar associations at the sub-district level, to district bar 
associations, to High Court bar associations at the provincial level, and 
finally to the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) at the apex. There 
are an estimated 200 bar associations across the country. These are the 
loci of  associational politics as well as social capital for lawyers, enabling 
them to engage in annual elections, coordinate activity across and 
within regions, and lobby for professional issues. The SCBA is a federal 
body composed exclusively of  Supreme Court lawyers and provides 
the anchor for the bar’s collective action at the national level. The 
decentralised and locally embedded network of  bar associations across 
the country heightens the mobilising potential of  lawyers (Munir 2012).
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In the post-independence era, the bar retained substantial autonomy 
over its internal politics. In contrast, the judiciary’s alignment with the 
increasingly militarised state deepened as Constitutional Courts became 
instrumental in legitimating extra-constitutional regimes (Khan 2016). 
Lawyers were at the forefront of  two major social movements against 
military dictators – the first, against General Ayub Khan in the 1960s 
and the second, against General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s (known as the 
Movement for the Restoration of  Democracy (MRD)). In both cases, 
the judiciary played the role of  regime legitimation, only to be heavily 
restrained through martial law or virtually ousted by military courts.
However, much as it is tempting to view lawyers and judges through 
a historical binary of  pro- and anti-democracy forces, past examples 
of  lawyers’ mobilisation (or lack of  it) show it is always contingent on 
political conditions. For instance, lawyers were active in a movement to 
dislodge the civilian Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government in 1977, 
resulting in General Zia’s military coup. Lawyers have proven similarly 
inconsistent in mobilising for judicial empowerment. For instance, when 
General Zia forced then Chief  Justice, Yaqub Ali, to vacate his office 
soon after the coup, Justice Ali’s resistance provoked little reaction from 
the bar.
Similarly, when General Musharraf  purged the judiciary after his 
military coup in October 1999, the refusal of  13 Constitutional Court 
judges to take a fresh oath barely attracted any notice. The bar’s muted 
reaction was consistent with the general political atmosphere in favour 
of  Musharraf  (Khan 2016). Musharraf  was able to further fragment 
political opposition by holding general elections in 2002 and creating 
a façade of  parliamentary politics. Coordinated action within the bar 
built up only gradually after these elections when, in August 2002, the 
regime proposed amendments to the Constitution – known as the Legal 
Framework Order (LFO) – for entrenching the military executive.
The LFO spurred an ‘anti-LFO movement’ (Malik 2008; Khan 2016). 
Bar leaders demanded that the Constitution be restored to its pre-LFO 
status, and that extensions to the retirement age of  regime judges – 
known as ‘PCO judges’ on account of  taking oath under Musharraf ’s 
‘Provisional Constitutional Order’ (PCO) in 1999 – be revoked. PCO 
judges, consistently loyal to Musharraf, were a major obstacle to 
declaring the LFO unconstitutional. In early 2003, bar representatives 
established a ‘National Action Committee’ (NAC) – comprising 
executives of  all bar organisations – as a channel for coordinated 
decision-making and mobilisation across the country. The NAC was 
instrumental in organising anti-LFO protests over the next two years.
The highlight of  the NAC-led movement came in late 2003 when 
the Musharraf  government withdrew the judicial tenure extension. 
Simultaneously, however, parliament approved Musharraf ’s controversial 
Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment (‘17th Amendment’), taking the 
steam out of  the bar’s advocacy on issues of  general importance such as 
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restoration of  the Constitution and regime change. Nonetheless, many 
anti-regime lawyers continued to agitate on these issues, and prominent 
players among them later became the vanguard (Halliday et al. 2012) of  
the Lawyers’ Movement (Jaffrelot 2015).
Viewed together, the anti-Zia mobilisation in the 1980s and the 
anti-LFO movement underscore lawyers’ capacity to mobilise 
against extra-constitutional regimes in the absence of  political party 
mobilisation. In both instances, lawyers’ action preceded political party 
involvement. However, there is an important qualifier: while political 
lawyering may be highly effectual in matters directly affecting the 
institutional and corporate interests of  the legal profession, it is unlikely 
to be successful on broader political issues without a convergence with 
constituencies outside the bar. Hence, although anti-LFO lawyers 
were successful on narrow grounds – halting the proposed extension to 
judicial tenure – they could not thwart the 17th Amendment without 
political party cooperation.
2.2 The Lawyers’ Movement
When Iftikhar Chaudhry became the Supreme Court Chief  Justice in 
June 2005, the relationship between anti-regime lawyers and judges was 
largely oppositional. As a Supreme Court judge, Chaudhry had decided 
in favour of  the Musharraf  regime in political cases between 2000 and 
2005. As Chief  Justice he took cognisance of  several cases involving 
government corruption and human rights violations (Khan 2014). Some 
of  his judgments had elements of  anti-regime judicial activism, but 
much as some lawyers may have perceived them as a brewing challenge 
to the military establishment (PILDAT 2007), influential sections of  the 
bar leadership maintained an oppositional posture towards the Supreme 
Court, not least because of  Chaudhry’s reputation as a close aide of  
Musharraf  and what interview respondents describe as his brusque, at 
times even hostile, courtroom demeanour.
On 9 March 2007, Musharraf  summoned the Chief  Justice and, in 
the presence of  senior military and intelligence officials, pressured him 
to resign over multiple allegations of  misconduct. The Chief  Justice 
courageously refused. Almost immediately, the media broke news of  the 
incident, repeatedly televising images of  Chaudhry flanked by military 
personnel. The same day, a hastily convened Supreme Judicial Council 
(SJC) – the body with exclusive powers for removing Constitutional 
Court judges – suspended the Chief  Justice pending adjudication 
of  a Presidential Reference against him (Iqbal 2007). A few days 
later, lawyers swarmed onto the streets in a show of  angry resistance, 
triggering a larger mobilisation in the ensuing weeks of  lawyers, civil 
society activists, and political party workers.
A large majority of  interview respondents suggested that the decay that 
had set in the Musharraf  regime and the larger political context of  
growing anti-regime sentiment were critical to the mobilisation. Many 
also viewed this incident as an attack on the legal fraternity as a whole. 
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These sentiments seem to point less to Chief  Justice-centred motivations 
for the movement and more to institutional ones of  preserving bar and 
bench autonomy against an extra-constitutional regime.
The movement evolved through shifting political conditions over the 
two years that followed. In the first phase, lawyers mobilised to reinstate 
the Chief  Justice. They used a combination of  street mobilisation – 
involving weekly strikes and protests, and countrywide circuits of  bar 
associations with the Chief  Justice himself  – and strategic litigation, 
forcing a transfer of  the Presidential Reference from the SJC to the 
Supreme Court for open proceedings. The media spontaneously allied 
with the protestors, reporting on the protests around the clock and 
publicising instances of  police force. The factor that imparted a deep 
sense of  cohesion and purpose to what was otherwise spontaneous 
collective outrage was the strategic action of  bar representatives who 
quickly emerged as movement leaders. In a matter of  days, these 
leaders brought mobilising lawyers under their control and organisation, 
catapulted the legal fraternity into the media spotlight, and adopted 
the Chief  Justice as a rallying symbol for their anti-Musharraf  struggle. 
A few months later, an emboldened Supreme Court dismissed the 
Reference and reinstated the Chief  Justice.
In the post-reinstatement phase, lawyers once again deployed a 
combination of  tactics both within and without the courtroom to 
buttress the court’s growing anti-regime activism in a bid to block 
Musharraf ’s re-election as President and to force a transition to civilian 
politics. While the first phase was largely about lawyers empowering judges, 
this second phase set in motion a cycle of  mutual empowerment.
In the third phase, the movement suffered a major setback when 
Musharraf  imposed emergency rule in November 2007 to block the 
court’s ruling against his dual office of  President and army chief  
(Qureshi 2010). The regime backlash against the court’s activism 
resulted in a massive judicial purge – over 60 Constitutional Court 
judges were dismissed and put under house arrest (Human Rights 
Watch 2007). A newly installed Supreme Court, with new PCO judges 
headed by a new Chief  Justice, swiftly validated the emergency (Khan 
2016). After the emergency was lifted in December 2007, lawyers 
launched the movement afresh and re-defined their objective in 
terms of  restoring the judiciary to its pre-emergency status, making a 
conscious choice to eschew court-centred strategies in favour of  street 
mobilisation and subversive activities such as court boycotts.
The movement’s fourth phase began with the electoral transition in 
February 2008. The newly elected coalition government headed by 
the PPP ordered the release of  all detained judges and lawyers, with 
a commitment to restore the judges in the near future. Movement 
leaders immediately rallied around the deposed judges and assimilated 
them into their street mobilisation. This led to a unique legal complex 
configuration outside the formal institutional space, with lawyers 
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and judges pursuing a harmonised agenda. For the next few months, 
movement lawyers and deposed judges were locked in a relationship 
of  mutual support, as the government repeatedly reneged on its 
commitment to restore the judges. The first ‘long march’ of  June 2008 – 
in which lawyers were joined by civil society actors in an overwhelming 
show of  support and strength – marked the apogee of  the movement. 
However, differences among bar leaders and between them and young 
lawyers over continuing a sit-in outside the Supreme Court at the 
conclusion of  the long march threatened to disintegrate the internal 
command of  the movement.
This led into the movement’s fifth phase, a period of  flux in which the 
ruling coalition of  the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz 
(PML-N) sought to regain political control by leveraging international 
support to impeach President Musharraf. Musharraf  pre-empted 
impeachment by resigning in August 2008, allowing the PPP to 
consolidate its position by electing its own co-chairperson as President. 
Movement lawyers attempted to directly lobby the government for 
restoration of  the remaining judges (Haq 2008), thus actively pursuing 
political party cooperation while continuing with street-based politics. 
However, with the resurgence of  political party control, the legal complex 
crumbled as a large majority of  deposed judges returned to the bench 
after taking a new oath (Abbas and Jasam 2009). In March 2009, a 
second ‘long march’, supported by the PML-N and allegedly backed by a 
negotiated political agreement involving the new army chief, culminated 
in the restoration of  the remaining deposed judges (Khan 2016).
2.3 What made the movement possible? Analysing the enabling conditions
The Lawyers’ Movement, while sharing some commonalities with past 
examples of  lawyers’ political action in Pakistan, is truly unprecedented. 
One key distinction is its immediate impact: the movement restructured the 
bargaining positions of  the regime vis-à-vis political parties, fomented 
the political space for a transition to civilian rule while forcing out the 
incumbent dictator, and succeeded in restoring illegally deposed judges 
(Munir 2012). Moreover, the mechanisms and strategies deployed by lawyers 
also stand out in three important ways. Firstly, lawyers were the principal 
movement activists; as such, they eclipsed the role of  political parties and 
other actors at crucial points in the movement, and mobilised more 
intensely and consistently than any other group. Secondly, the forms 
of  political action that the lawyers used were unconventional and highly 
tactical. Though lawyers in Pakistan have previously relied on street 
mobilisation, the strategic way in which they switched from one action 
to another, or adopted parallel methods when the situation necessitated, 
or made voluntary coalitions for achieving short-term goals, gave the 
movement a very different character.
Finally, the bar’s insistence on autonomy was also something new. Lawyers 
claimed to represent causes independent of  what they viewed as the 
parochial agendas of  political parties. Thus, lawyers did not perceive 
their role as auxiliaries to political parties as was the case in past social 
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movements such as the MRD in the 1980s. Instead, they pushed for 
their own goals as well as their own narrative, even as they sometimes 
welcomed parallel support from political parties and civil society groups.
What were the broader conditions that made this kind of  political action 
for judicial empowerment possible? The evidence suggests that the 
movement was predicated on six interlocking conditions: (1) a historically 
organised bar with high mobilising potential; (2) deepening political 
consensus within the bar in opposition to the incumbent military regime; 
(3) broad anti-regime convergence of  political constituencies within and 
without the bar; (4) absence of  a united political opposition and/or low 
potential for a political party-led mobilisation; (5) functional courts with 
judicial review powers; and (6) a visible cause-generating event linked to 
the institutional interests of  the bar.
The first two conditions – namely, an organised bar with high 
mobilising potential, and an intra-bar political consensus against 
unconstitutional regimes – are common to most instances of  political 
mobilisation by lawyers in Pakistan (Rizvi 2015). Parallels between the 
Lawyers’ Movement on the one hand, and the MRD and anti-LFO 
movements on the other, testify to the institutional capacity of  the bar 
to engage in collective action, and to do so through unconventional 
techniques, including disruptive and subversive practices such as 
strikes, boycotts, and mass street mobilisation. The historical parallels 
also point to a broad oppositional consensus within the bar against 
military rule. However, this consensus has seldom been immediate and 
spontaneous. In the 1980s as well as the 2000s, the consensus against 
military government within the bar deepened only gradually and 
was contingent on active bar politics. The passage of  time helped the 
cause of  politically motivated lawyers as the negative consequences of  
military rule became more apparent, and as the initial euphoria that 
characterised the coups turned to ambivalence, if  not antagonism.
The third condition – a broad convergence of  anti-regime 
constituencies – is also apparent in all successful mobilisations. In 
both the MRD and the Lawyers’ Movement, at least some if  not all 
mainstream political parties supported the bar’s anti-regime political 
action at crucial moments. When this broad convergence thinned out, 
the mobilisation too experienced a downturn.
In addition to historical similarities, differences between the Lawyers’ 
Movement and past mobilisations also shed light on other conditions 
of  mobilisation. One major difference lies in the nexus between the 
political action of  lawyers and political party opposition. For instance, 
in the 1980s, the goal of  lawyers’ mobilisation was to facilitate a revival 
of  political activity on behalf  of  political parties that were deeply 
suppressed under martial law. Lawyers played a central role in unifying 
anti-regime parties under the common platform of  the MRD, with the 
parties building on the efforts of  the lawyers to foment a mass social 
movement.
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In contrast, in the early 2000s, anti-regime lawyers had to contend with 
a divided political opposition. Unlike Zia, Musharraf  made good on his 
promise of  holding elections within three years of  his coup, ensuring 
that there was less incentive for political parties to create a strong 
opposition coalition. As parties sought opportunities for reconciliation 
with the military regime, not only did lawyers come to view them with 
circumspection, they also capitalised on the political space open to them 
to define and execute their own agendas. This allowed lawyers to maintain 
institutional autonomy even as they engaged in unprecedented strategies 
for judicial empowerment. From this, one may surmise that the nature 
of  political party opposition pre-mobilisation significantly determines the 
degree of  autonomous agenda-setting in political lawyering.
Another major difference in the Lawyers’ Movement was the status of  
the judiciary. Unlike General Zia’s clampdown on Constitutional Courts 
and indefinite suspension of  their fundamental rights jurisdiction in the 
1980s, Musharraf ’s government initially tolerated the courts as part 
of  its international rhetoric on ‘guided democracy’ and ‘rule of  law’ 
(Talbot 2002), and took a calculated risk in permitting them to exercise 
their inherent judicial review powers. Moreover, while the Constitution 
remained suspended for seven years under Zia, Musharraf  revived it 
within three years as a prelude to elections. This early revival of  the 
Constitution allowed the courts much greater agency and kept open the 
possibility of  lawyers pushing legitimacy-seeking judges into mounting a 
more effective challenge to the regime. In other words, it created an arena 
for judges to cooperate with anti-regime lawyers. In the absence of  a 
united political opposition, a mutually supportive legal complex emerged.
Finally, the extraordinary and mutually empowering alliance between 
lawyers and judges may not have materialised had it not been for the 
media-driven spectacle of  the Chief  Justice’s defiance at a time when 
political opposition to Musharraf  was high, and an organisational 
machinery already in place for coordinated action by anti-regime 
lawyers. The ‘pre’ mobilisation greatly enhanced the likelihood that an 
incident of  this nature could be used to coalesce an otherwise politically 
diverse, and at times divided, bar. So, although the removal and bold 
insubordination of  the Chief  Justice were cause-generating factors, the 
fact they happened within the context of  a larger political consensus 
against the military regime was a necessary condition for successful 
mobilisation.
3 Post-movement politics – whither accountability?
3.1 From movement to post-movement politics
The larger political context, combined with the mechanisms and 
strategies of  activist lawyers, created downstream constraints in 
the aftermath of  the movement for the accountability of  both 
judges and lawyers. Firstly, the military regime’s assault on the 
judiciary perpetuated a binary in the movement narrative between 
judicial empowerment and regime accountability. Lawyers viewed 
empowerment and accountability as inhabiting two different and 
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competing spheres: the judiciary on the one hand and the executive 
on the other. Especially from the third phase onwards, when the 
large-scale dismissal of  judges made their restoration synonymous with 
judicial independence, it was impossible for the movement narrative to 
simultaneously accommodate the goals of  judicial empowerment and 
accountability. This binary carried over into the post-election period 
because of  the civilian government’s reluctance to restore the judges. 
Thus, there was an inevitable delay in the emergence of  constituents 
within the bar for judicial accountability as well as of  a general 
discourse on accountability in the bar and the bench.
Secondly, lawyers’ strategies of  popularising the judges, and particularly 
Chief  Justice Chaudhry, created a cult of  personality. Chaudhry’s 
self-projection as a populist judge was evident in the zeal with which 
the post-restoration Supreme Court deployed its suo motu powers and 
mounted challenges to the civilian government (Khan 2014).
Thirdly, the delays in and the modality of  the final restoration of  the 
judges in March 2009 – through a long march supported by PML-N 
against the reluctant PPP-led government – created an environment of  
distrust between the restored judges and the government. In order to 
ensure fidelity to their agenda of  judicial independence, the restored 
judges, led by the Chief  Justice, embarked on a plan to reorganise 
Constitutional Court membership. In their view, the courts needed to 
be purged of  ‘illegitimate’ judges: namely, PCO judges who took oath 
under Musharraf ’s emergency law in 2007, as well as those who took 
oath under Chief  Justice Dogar after the emergency and, again, after 
the ousting of  Musharraf  in August 2008. The chasm between the 
core group of  judges and the government, and by extension the wider 
circle of  judges legitimised by the ruling government, largely explains 
the Chief  Justice’s motivation for the purge (Kalhan 2013). Arguably, 
this reshuffling was a form of  judicial accountability, but only in the 
very narrow sense of  removing judges ostensibly loyal to the Musharraf  
regime (Gazdar 2009). Indeed, sections of  the bar, including many 
former supporters, accused the Chief  Justice of  vendetta, and of  
stacking the courts with his own loyalists (Walsh 2013).
All these factors – the movement’s focus on judicial empowerment, 
the rise of  judicial populism, the re-entrenchment of  the Chief  Justice 
in the Supreme Court, and the judiciary–government conflict in the 
post-Musharraf  era – collectively contributed to a hyper-activist apex 
court asserting its newfound normative authority over a fragile civilian 
government during Chaudhry’s tenure from 2009 to 2013 (Kalhan 
2013). This post-movement period of  judicial assertion opened up rare 
opportunities for the judiciary to arrogate to itself  executive powers, 
notably the power of  judicial appointments in the Constitutional Courts 
(Ijaz 2014; Oldenburg 2016). The power to select judges was a major 
arena of  contestation between the judiciary and the executive as well as 
the legislature. Originally, the Constitution authorised the President to 
appoint and promote judges in consultation with the Chief  Justice.
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In 2010, the new civilian government introduced a two-tiered 
participatory process involving the judiciary, bar, and parliament to 
minimise judicial–executive conflicts and court-packing. However, 
the Supreme Court overrode this amendment by extinguishing 
parliamentary oversight from the appointments process (Kalhan 2013). 
The result was a hegemonic role for the Chief  Justice in Constitutional 
Court composition, as he presided over the selection, promotion, and 
removal of  judges (Rahman 2017). Hence, far from creating conditions 
for making the judiciary more inclusive and accountable, the political 
transition to civilian rule in the aftermath of  the movement enhanced 
the power of  the Supreme Court while concurrently allowing the 
judiciary to insulate itself  from external accountability (Kalhan 2013; 
ICJ 2013; Khan 2014; Siddique 2015).
In the five years since Chief  Justice Chaudhry’s retirement in 2013, five 
Supreme Court Chief  Justices have peacefully completed their tenure. 
During this period, the court has decided many major political cases 
– the most recent being a series of  judgments between 2017 and 2018 
disqualifying the incumbent Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, on corruption 
charges (Bhatti 2018). Thus, it appears that the Lawyers’ Movement has 
had enduring judicial empowerment outcomes in the form of  security 
of  tenure for judges. At the same time, the litany of  criticisms against the 
judiciary, and especially the Supreme Court, has expanded.
The gravamen of  these criticisms is that while the court’s political 
impact and autonomy have increased, it has not only deliberately 
eschewed questions of  judicial accountability but also failed at deeper 
institutional reform and a fairer distribution of  resources to the district 
courts, the backbone of  the judicial system. Litigants who frequent 
these lower courts continue to suffer as before from neglect and reform 
inertia (Siddique 2013). Thus, the gains in judicial independence appear 
to be limited in two ways. Firstly, they relate to a very narrow sphere 
of  governmental accountability on mostly political and governance-
related matters, with the Supreme Court acting as an arbiter of  
mega-politics and the fate of  elected governments (Kalhan 2013; Khan 
2014; Siddique 2015). Secondly, empowerment gains have not cascaded 
down to the district judiciary, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 
posturing on judicial reform through the 2009 National Judicial Policy 
(Siddique 2013).
3.2 Bar politics and accountability bottlenecks
Many of  the Supreme Court’s critics are erstwhile leaders and active 
movement mobilisers. Why, then, has the bar not engaged in effective 
collective action for judicial accountability? The following analysis 
shifts the focus to post-movement bar politics to explore why Pakistan’s 
lawyers are weak pro-accountability actors and whether there is any 
scope for their political action on accountability-related issues.
It is important to highlight at the outset that just as the judiciary suffers 
from an accountability deficit, the bar is riven by its own problems 
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which appear to be heightened in the aftermath of  the movement. One 
key issue is the rapid decline in lawyers’ moral social standing. In just 
a few years, lawyers’ public image has gone from heroes to ‘hooligans’ 
(Leiby 2012; Mir 2017). Lawyers are increasingly violent and disruptive 
both inside and outside the courtroom, against other lawyers, police, 
litigants, and even judges – a phenomenon described in local parlance 
as ‘wukala gardi’. It is widely felt that the movement has emboldened 
lawyers, particularly younger lawyers, to use their ‘newly-discovered 
power of  defiance’ to undermine the legal system (Rizvi 2015).
Interview respondents speculate that the ‘hooliganism’ is a result of  
incompetent lawyers rising to prominence based on their fidelity to the 
movement, or because generally lawyers have become emboldened 
about agitating against judges, or both. Wukala gardi, although perceived 
as normalised only among a minority of  the legal community, raises 
serious doubts about lawyers’ agency for judicial accountability and also 
lawyers’ own discipline and accountability.
Be that as it may, the bar is not devoid of  a constituency for judicial 
accountability. The first post-restoration bar association elections – held 
in the SCBA in October 2009 – demonstrated an even split between 
support for and opposition to veteran lawyer and movement leader 
Hamid Khan and his ‘Professional Group’ on the question of  judicial 
accountability. This intra-bar split emerged, partially, in reaction to 
Chief  Justice Chaudhry’s decision to purge the judiciary and wrench 
control of  judicial appointments from parliament. The main contention 
of  the Professional Group was that the bar must strive to consolidate 
movement gains by buttressing the restored judiciary’s powers despite 
the democratic transition. That Khan’s presidential candidate for the 
SCBA secured a marginal victory not only signalled shifting alliances at 
the bar’s highest levels, but also a return to ordinary politics for the bar.
In 2010, Asma Jahangir – a lawyer and social activist who rose to 
eminence in the 1980s for her anti-Zia resistance and human rights 
advocacy – defeated Khan’s candidate to become the first female SCBA 
President (Dawn 2010). Since then, elections in the SCBA as well as 
bar associations across Punjab have been dominated by two factions: 
Hamid Khan’s pro-judiciary Professional Group and Asma Jahangir’s 
pro-accountability ‘Independent Group’. The latter has argued against 
judicial arbitrariness and pushed for greater accountability in the 
wider context of  the struggle for civilian political supremacy (Express 
Tribune 2011).
Despite the existence of  a pro-accountability constituency, it appears 
that lack of  cohesion in the bar leadership is an important factor 
inhibiting effective political action, especially because of  the nature 
of  the cleavage. The fact that the split was grounded in the very 
issue of  judicial accountability with an entrenched ‘pro-judiciary’ 
group in favour of  the status quo, impeded political action to address 
the accountability deficit. In addition, the pro-accountability group 
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was seen to have its own accountability deficit insofar as it claimed 
to represent the interests of  PCO judges removed by Chief  Justice 
Chaudhry (Sheikh 2012), fuelling the impression that the group’s 
primary agenda was to settle scores with Chaudhry and his allies.
Another factor that has compounded the lack of  cohesion in the bar 
is the nature of  coalitions between a cross-section of  lawyers and 
Constitutional Court judges. Of  the interview respondents active 
in bar politics, several criticised what they perceived to be clientelist 
relationships between judges – ostensibly beneficiaries of  the movement 
– and pro-judiciary lawyers in the movement’s immediate aftermath. 
The judiciary’s hegemony over judge selection brought about a wider 
shift in the way that power and privileges were allocated in the legal 
complex. Previously, the selection power was shared between the 
executive and the judiciary, with the former typically trumping the 
latter. Post-movement, power came to rest firmly with the Supreme 
Court, incentivising lawyer–judge nepotism (Express Tribune 2012) that 
effectively thwarted political action for judicial accountability, with 
lawyers vying for leverage in the judiciary and judges maintaining 
constituencies in the bar for their judicial activism. Equally, the 
near-unconditional support from strong sections of  the bar in the 
post-restoration period allowed the court to drag its feet on resuscitating 
the SJC (Niazi 2016).
The accountability bottlenecks in the Constitutional Courts – namely 
the cleavage in the bar on the question of  accountability and the 
clientelist cooperation between exclusive groups of  lawyers and judges 
– flowed directly from the movement-centred trajectory of  judicial 
empowerment. Almost a decade after the restoration, a majority 
of  survey respondents still echo this view: when asked whether they 
thought the current dynamic between the bar and the bench was 
attributable to the movement, 40 per cent said ‘highly’ or ‘very highly’ 
and 34 per cent said ‘partially’.
3.3 The ‘new’ legal complex
The accountability bottlenecks point to an underlying structure within 
the legal complex that is based on mutuality between segments in 
the bar and the bench. This structure instantiates a ‘cross-cutting’ 
legal complex (Halliday et al. 2012) in which, at any given time, a 
cross-section of  lawyers and judges cooperate for mutual entrenchment 
while the larger bar–bench relationship ranges from unengaged to 
oppositional. Over time, the divide between the Professional and 
Independent Groups has become as much about pro-judiciary and 
pro-accountability as about the politics of  entrenchment and elite 
capture. This is reflected in the near-unanimous opinion of  survey 
respondents (89 per cent) that bar representatives should have a greater 
role in the judicial appointments process. This configuration is markedly 
different from the pre-movement legal complex that consisted of  a 
pro-regime and anti-regime cleavage. It is also very distinct from the 
legal complex underpinning the movement in which, broadly speaking, 
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the bar cohered around the anti-regime group to build a cooperative 
legal complex against a third party, the regime. In the present 
cross-cutting legal complex, cooperative and oppositional segments 
coexist in tension but are also fluid and contingent on alliances with the 
evolving locus of  power within the higher judiciary.
The mixed survey responses reflect this complexity. When asked to 
characterise the present bar–bench relationship, 35 per cent said it was 
‘highly cooperative’ or ‘cooperative’, while 21 per cent said, ‘highly 
conflicted’ or ‘conflicted’. A majority (44 per cent) thought that the 
relationship was ‘neither cooperative nor conflicted’. When asked about 
the main reasons for the bar–bench conflict, there were varied responses 
with the most recurrent being, ‘the attitude of  lawyers and judges with 
each other creates conflict’ (25 per cent) and ‘leaders of  the bar are to 
blame for the bar–bench conflict’ (11 per cent). A high 90 per cent of  all 
respondents were in favour of  greater bar–bench cooperation.
Nonetheless, this cross-cutting legal complex is not a static configuration 
and tends to gravitate to oppositional mode under conditions 
threatening the bar. This typically happens when the judiciary makes 
a direct attempt at holding lawyers – particularly bar office holders – 
accountable for misconduct against judges. An example is the recent 
‘Multan Bench controversy’, triggered by an altercation between a 
Lahore High Court (LHC) judge sitting on a bench in Multan and 
the President of  the Multan Bar Association, Sher Zaman Qureshi. 
Courtroom confrontations between lawyers and judges, often involving 
threats and violence, are not uncommon and are widely publicised in 
the media. On this occasion, an allegedly heated exchange between 
the judge and Qureshi spiralled into a mob-like reaction from Multan 
district bar lawyers.
In response, the LHC Chief  Justice, Mansoor Ali Shah – known for 
his pro-accountability interventions against both lawyers and judges 
(Husain 2016) – immediately recalled all judges on the Multan Bench, 
and constituted a new bench which suspended Qureshi’s licence 
and issued him a show cause notice for contempt of  court. Qureshi 
refused to appear and lawyers aggressively protested in Justice Shah’s 
courtroom. Subsequently, when the LHC issued an arrest warrant for 
Qureshi, lawyers clashed violently with anti-riot police (Malik 2017b).
When asked about their views on these events, survey respondents had 
remarkably homogeneous reactions against Justice Shah’s interventions: 
almost 87 per cent disagreed with the recall of  Multan Bench judges, 
and 84 per cent did not support the decision to suspend Qureshi’s 
licence and issue him a contempt notice. Thus, contrary to the view that 
bar–bench standoffs are essentially conflicts between pro-accountability 
judges such as Justice Shah and elite lawyers (Husain 2016), lawyers 
across the board appear to be strongly opposed to the judiciary taking 
direct disciplinary action against bar members. Lawyers also believe 
that the judiciary is sidestepping the rising number of  complaints 
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of  judicial misconduct in the SJC. An overwhelming 90 per cent of  
respondents wished to see the SJC functional again. Taken together, 
these figures show a strong self-preservation instinct, a clear preference 
for self-accountability, and a high demand for judicial accountability 
through the SJC. The politics of  self-preservation can be further gauged 
from the fact that, barring exceptions such as Asma Jahangir, there 
was little public condemnation by senior bar leaders of  the misconduct 
and violence in the Multan case. This is evidence that lawyers are poor 
receptors of  external accountability interventions, including from the 
judiciary, and on this axis the legal complex is deeply oppositional.
4 Conclusion
The Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement case study and its aftermath presents 
two salient findings for our understanding of  political action and 
how it relates to judicial empowerment and accountability. Firstly, the 
conditions, processes, and methods of  empowerment may impose 
significant limits on the outcomes, benefits, and gains that flow from 
them. In Pakistan, the political context combined with political lawyering 
as a pathway to judicial empowerment have profoundly shaped both 
the course and institutional quality of  the judiciary’s power. In a bid to 
consolidate its newfound populist authority, the judiciary has expanded 
its jurisdiction towards routine and arbitrary intervention in political 
and governance-related questions to the detriment of  its ever-spiralling 
regular caseload (Malik 2017a). The judiciary’s hyper-assertion of  
autonomy in this narrow sphere of  judiciary–executive relations has, in 
turn, led to democracy-weakening outcomes (Siddique, forthcoming). 
At the same time, the concentration of  power within the Supreme Court 
and its singular focus on political questions has ensured that there is 
no structural change within the judicial institution itself. If  anything, it 
appears to have become even more hierarchical and stratified than before.
Secondly, the conditions for empowerment and accountability may 
be altogether different, especially where the processes leading up to 
them are structured sequentially or are otherwise temporally distinct. 
Indeed, the conditions for and pathway to empowerment may 
produce unintended constraints and perverse consequences for the 
accountability of  empowered actors and institutions. In Pakistan’s 
case, judicial empowerment – despite the strong mutuality between 
lawyers and judges during much of  the movement – has led to new 
accountability bargains such that there is a deep distrust of  and 
resistance to inter-institutional accountability between the judiciary and 
the bar, and as a result a clear tendency in both institutions towards 
self-regulation and self-accountability.
On the one hand, Constitutional Court judges exercise exclusive power 
over judicial appointments and bestow selective privilege on favoured 
lawyers to sustain their populism. On the other, bar leaders leverage 
well-entrenched constituencies within the bar to jockey for judicial 
patronage or to press the court for desired outcomes in important 
briefs. In this inward-looking and self-preserving environment, there 
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are impromptu attempts on both sides to discipline and hold the 
other accountable, often resulting in either an accountability deadlock 
or indirect accountability through mechanisms such as judicial 
appointments and judicial transfers.
Quite apart from the accountability deadlock between the judiciary 
and the bar, there is another important accountability bargain that has 
emerged in reaction to the movement that wields a covert, but systemic 
influence, on the Supreme Court – namely, the ‘military–judicial 
complex’. While judicial empowerment has ensured de jure security 
of  tenure for Constitutional Court judges, it cannot be credited with 
bringing about a structural transformation in the imbalance of  power 
between military and civilian institutions. Even as the legal complex 
has championed a narrative of  embedding an independent judiciary 
and ousting military rule, the deep state has mobilised its resources to 
adapt to the political transitions of  the past decade and to accumulate 
executive and judicial powers without any overt or extra-constitutional 
political interventions. The most dramatic example of  this in the 
movement aftermath was the constitutional consensus on the transfer of  
judicial power in a number of  vaguely defined terrorism-related offences 
to the military courts without recourse to fundamental rights-based 
remedies (Newberg 2016). In the more recent imbroglio involving 
the forced removal of  an elected Prime Minister in the run-up to the 
2018 general election, the military publicly supported the Supreme 
Court’s relentless chastening of  the PML-N (Gul 2018) – a historically 
military-friendly political party that has fallen out of  favour with the 
establishment – raising allegations that the court’s ‘celebrity judges’ are 
aligned with the military’s interests (Hussain 2018; The Economist 2018).
The simultaneous emasculation and propping up of  the Constitutional 
Courts by the military reproduces the old dynamic of  judicial 
collaboration for de facto control over the political process, albeit through 
indirect means. The revival of  the military–judicial complex means 
that while the judiciary may freely assert its autonomy over civilian 
governments, its institutional survival and accountability is still, as in the 
past, closely tied to the military’s political agenda. Thus, the sources of  
judicial empowerment and accountability tend to occupy different, even 
mutually exclusive, spheres, underscoring the fact that the relationship 
between the two is highly contingent on the historical, political, and 
institutional context.
Notes
*  This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was prepared as part of  Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA), an international research 
programme exploring social and political action in fragile, conflict, 
and violent settings. A4EA is a consortium led by IDS and funded 
with UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of  our funder.
1 Maryam S. Khan, Research Fellow, Institute of  Development and 
Economic Alternatives (IDEAS), Pakistan.
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